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THE MODERN DAY SCARLET LETTER 
Ifeoma Ajunwa* 
 
The stigma gone, Hester heaved a long, deep sigh, in which the burden of 
shame and anguish departed from her spirit.  O exquisite relief!  She had 
not known the weight, until she felt the freedom!1 
American society has come to presuppose the efficacy of the collateral 
legal consequences of criminal conviction.  But little attention has been 
paid to their effects on the reintegration efforts of the formerly incarcerated 
and, in particular, formerly incarcerated women.  An 1848 case, Sutton v. 
McIlhany, affirmed collateral legal consequences as constituting an 
important part of criminal punishment.  More recent cases, such as Turner 
v. Glickman, in which a class of people convicted of drug crimes were 
subsequently denied food stamps and other government benefits, have 
upheld the constitutionality of imposing these legal penalties on an 
individual even after she has served her prison sentence. 
This Article argues that the collateral legal consequences of criminal 
conviction represent a “modern day scarlet letter” that lingers with the 
formerly incarcerated woman for life and that serves to circumscribe those 
individuals’ economic and social opportunities.  Calling upon critical legal 
theory and empirical social science research, this Article argues that the 
collateral legal consequences of conviction exact a disproportionate cost on 
formerly incarcerated women.  Expanding upon the understanding of 
Professor Kimberlé Crenshaw’s critical legal theory of “intersectionality,” 
this Article discusses the predominant intersectional identities that formerly 
incarcerated women embody and examines how these identities compound 
the impact of collateral legal consequences.  This Article finds that Black 
women are most negatively impacted by the collateral legal consequences 
of incarceration.  Relying on Professor Martha Fineman’s concepts, this 
Article argues that the state has a “positive obligation” to abrogate 
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collateral legal consequences that disproportionately negatively impact 
women and to mandate gender-sensitive policies for federally subsidized 
reentry organizations.  This Article proposes a model of reentry that is 
cognizant of the increased vulnerability of formerly incarcerated women 
and that is better designed to accommodate the exigencies that are intrinsic 
to their intersectional identities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Mass incarceration2 is one of the most significant social problems in 
America.  Although men represent the majority of the incarcerated 
 
 2. Studies show that nearly one in three Americans have been arrested by age twenty-
three and that on any given day, there are 1 in 100 adults behind bars. See Amy L. Solomon, 
In Search of a Job:  Criminal Records As Barriers to Employment, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE 
(June 15, 2012), http://www.nij.gov/journals/270/criminal-records.htm.  Some scholars 
argue that the term “hyperincarceration” is a more appropriate descriptor for the high rates of 
imprisonment in the United States as those rates are highest in certain populations—Black 
and Latino males—rather than throughout the mass population of the United States. See, e.g., 
Loïc Wacquant, Forum, in RACE, INCARCERATION, AND AMERICAN VALUES 57, 59 (2008) 
(arguing for the use of “hyper-incarceration” rather than “mass incarceration”); see also 
Frank Rudy Cooper, Hyper-Incarceration As a Multidimensional Attack:  Replying to 
Angela Harris Through the Wire, 37 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 67 (2011) (arguing that 
hyperincarceration is a multidimentsional attack on Blacks and Latinos).  Although 
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population, women comprise the fastest growing segment of the 
incarcerated in the United States—to illustrate, from 1995 to 2008, the 
female prison population increased by 203 percent.3  As of 2003, nearly one 
million women were in some way “under the control of the criminal justice 
system,” including 72,671 women who were in prison, 167,000 in jail, and 
800,000 on parole and probation.4  Almost half of those women were 
African American.5 
While there are myriad legal issues6 associated with mass incarceration, 
this Article constrains its focus to the impact of the collateral legal 
consequences of conviction,7 particularly as they affect formerly 
 
“hyperincarceration” might have been a more accurate description in the early 1990s when 
the War on Drugs (and its harsh sentencing policies) most targeted crack cocaine, this is no 
longer the case.  Given the decline of crack cocaine, a drug associated with Black and Latino 
populations and the rise in the use and sale of heroin and methamphetamines associated 
more with white populations, the War on Drugs now impacts all U.S. communities and has 
indeed led to the mass incarceration of many individuals. See, e.g., Combat 
Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 2005 (CMEA), Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 256 
(2006); see also Zusha Elinson, Heroin Makes a Comeback:  This Time, Small Towns Are 
Increasingly Beset by Addiction, Drug-Related Crimes, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 8, 2013), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323997004578640531575133750.html 
(detailing the rise of heroin addiction in rural areas and the accompanying rise in crime). 
 3. See DARRELL GILLIARD & ALLEN BECK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ-
161132, PRISON AND JAIL INMATES, 1995 (1996), available at 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/PJI95.PDF; WILLIAM J. SABOL ET AL., BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 228417, PRISONERS IN 2008 (2009), available at 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p08.pdf. 
 4. Natalie J. Sokoloff, The Impact of the Prison Industrial Complex on African 
American Women, 5 SOULS 31, 32 (2003). 
 5. Id. 
 6. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in 
African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1275, 1278 (2004) (detailing the 
pernicious effects of the War on Drugs on African American communities); Bryan A. 
Stevenson, Confronting Mass Imprisonment and Restoring Fairness to Collateral Review of 
Criminal Cases, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339, 343 (2006) (documenting how mass 
incarceration has disrupted the administration of the criminal justice system); see also 
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW:  MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 178–220 (2010) (arguing that mass incarceration resembles the Jim Crow 
laws because of its disproportionate impact on Black and Latino males in the United States); 
Ifeoma Ajunwa, “Bad Barrels”:  An Organizational-Based Analysis of the Human Rights 
Abuses at Abu Ghraib Prison, 17 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 75, 76–77 (2014) 
(demonstrating that human rights abuses on par with the infamous incidents at the American 
military Abu Ghraib prison also routinely occur within American domestic prisons, most 
notably in the Los Angeles jail system); Ann Cammett, Shadow Citizens:  Felony 
Disenfranchisement and the Criminalization of Debt, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 349, 349 (2013) 
(asserting that “criminal justice debt can serve as an insurmountable obstacle to the 
resumption of voting rights and broader participation in society”); Nekima Levy-Pounds, 
Beaten by the System and Down for the Count:  Why Poor Women of Color and Children 
Don’t Stand a Chance Against U.S. Drug-Sentencing Policy, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 462, 494 
(2006) (arguing that poor women of color and their children are adversely impacted by 
current drug sentencing policies because such policies are designed to relegate women of 
color and their children into a perpetual “pink hole,” which “engulfs the most vulnerable 
members of society”). 
 7. Margaret Colgate Love, Starting Over with a Clean Slate:  In Praise of a Forgotten 
Section of the Model Penal Code, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1705, 1705 (2003) (“The collateral 
consequences of a criminal conviction linger long after the sentence imposed by the court 
has been served.”). 
3002 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
incarcerated women.  This Article argues, with the support of empirical 
evidence, that formerly incarcerated women are disproportionately 
impacted by the collateral legal consequences of criminal conviction 
because of their intersectional identities.8  This Article does not overlook 
the fact that formerly incarcerated men are also negatively affected by the 
collateral legal consequences of conviction.  In fact, much of the social 
science research on the impact of collateral legal consequences has focused 
exclusively on men, as is evidenced by the landmark work of Harvard 
sociologist Devah Pager.9  The work of sociologists Bruce Western and 
Becky Pettit also has exclusively focused on male populations.10  In 
contrast, the struggles of formerly incarcerated women to reintegrate into 
society after imprisonment have remained relatively understudied. 
This Article does not affirm that the collateral legal consequences of 
conviction should apply only to men and not women; the paramount thesis 
is that the government ought to consider how, because of the genres of 
intersectional identities that predominate among the population of formerly 
incarcerated women, these women are disproportionately impacted by the 
punitive policies that the collateral legal consequences of conviction 
represent. 
Furthermore, while this Article acknowledges that Black11 women are 
the most negatively impacted by collateral legal consequences, the decision 
to not focus exclusively on the plight of Black women is one based on the 
long recognized reality in critical legal theory studies that coalition building 
is necessary to engender positive social change and avoid marginalization.12  
Thus, by framing the issue in a multiracial manner, I allow other groups to 
 
 8. See Marne L. Lenox, Neutralizing the Gendered Collateral Consequences of the 
War on Drugs, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 280 (2011) (finding that women are unjustly impacted by 
the collateral legal consequences of criminal conviction but not presenting empirical 
evidence in the form of interviews of the women). 
 9. See Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937, 959 (2003) 
(finding that Black male job applicants with criminal records were the least likely to get a 
callback interview).  Pager also found that Black applicants without a criminal record 
received fewer callbacks than white applicants with a criminal record. Id. at 958; see also 
Devah Pager, Double Jeopardy:  Race, Crime, and Getting a Job, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 617 
(discussing the legal implications of the author’s audit study of employment prospects for 
formerly incarcerated men). 
 10. See Bruce Western & Becky Pettit, Incarceration & Social Inequality, 2010 
DAEDALUS 8 (noting the cycle of inequality created by the intergenerational incarceration of 
Black and Latino males, especially those in their twenties with low education credentials). 
 11. Following the tradition in critical race theory whose founders have noted that 
“Blacks, like Asians [and] Latinos . . . constitute a specific cultural group and, as such, 
require denotation as a proper noun,” I capitalize “Black” as a racial descriptor in the United 
States. Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchement:  Transformation 
and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1332 n.2 (1988).  
However, I also use the term “African American” interchangeably with the term “Black.”  
This use is based on the realities of U.S. law enforcement wherein people of African 
ancestry with dark skin are racially profiled, with no consideration for cultural background. 
 12. See James Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration:  Beyond the New 
Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21, 64 (2012) (“[F]raming issues in terms of black and white 
discourages other racial minorities from engaging in coalition politics.”); see also Anthony 
V. Alfieri & Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Next-Generation Civil Rights Lawyers:  Race and 
Representation in the Age of Identity Performance, 122 YALE L.J. 1484, 1520–30 (2013). 
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come to recognize how their interests align with those of Black women who 
are most disproportionally impacted by the policies.13 
With the same aim of reaching all audiences, this Article employs 
ethnographic data and interviews of formerly incarcerated women from an 
academic study14 to illustrate some of the hurdles that formerly incarcerated 
women face as a result of the intersection of their gender, criminal record, 
and other identities.  The purpose of such empirical social science data is 
twofold.  First, the interviews provide a nonfiction narrative.  Narratives 
have become an integral part of critical legal studies scholarship,15 
particularly as a means to focus the reader’s attention on legal inequalities 
that had hitherto gone unrecognized.16  However, the presence of narratives 
in legal scholarship has been criticized.17 
In this Article, the empirically derived narratives, obtained through 
rigorous social science protocols, address the criticism that the use of 
narratives in critical race scholarship can distort the truth.  The intent 
behind the inclusion of such narrative is not to reify “objectivity.”  As a 
social science discipline, sociology recognizes that even at the collection 
stage, the researcher inevitably influences the results of her research, even if 
by her mere presence.18 
 
 13. Alfieri & Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 12, at 1519 (arguing for a redefinition of 
what civil rights law practice means in the present day and that the new civil rights “extend 
beyond race, embracing rights movements on issues such as sex, sexuality, disability and 
immigration”). 
 14. Under the auspices of the sociology doctoral program of Columbia University, I 
conducted an ethnography of a reentry organization in Ohio, where I interviewed formerly 
incarcerated men and women who make use of the organization.  This study was approved 
by the Human Research Internal Review Board of Columbia University as research protocol 
IRB-AAAK9867.  To ensure anonymity, the respondents are assigned a numerical identifier.  
This is in no way meant to minimize the humanity of the women who graciously shared their 
lived experiences with me. 
 15. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED:  THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL 
JUSTICE (1987); DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL:  THE PERMANENCE OF 
RACISM (1992); DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (6th ed. 2008). 
 16. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others:  A Plea for 
Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2440 (1989) (“Stories humanize us.  They emphasize our 
differences in ways that can ultimately bring us closer together.  They allow us to see how 
the world looks from behind someone else’s spectacles.  They challenge us to wipe off our 
own lenses and ask, ‘Could I have been overlooking something all along?’”); see also 
Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 971, 972 (1991) (“They may 
be a bridge to those who share a similar vision, or a means of inciting change among those 
who do not.”); Charles Lawrence III, Listening for Stories in All the Right Places:  Narrative 
and Racial Formation Theory, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 247, 251 (2012) (“Stories express 
depth and complexity, and allow for ambiguity and multiple interpretations.  They inspire 
feelings of commonality, connectedness, and empathy among tellers, listeners, and the 
subjects of our stories.”). 
 17. DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON:  THE RADICAL 
ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW 39 (1997) (“[S]tories can distort legal debate, 
particularly if those stories are atypical, inaccurate, or incomplete.”). 
 18. In sociological ethnographic work, researchers are expected to think about how their 
identity and experiences could influence their research. See Anne-Marie Ambert et al., 
Understanding and Evaluating Qualitative Research, 57 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 879, 879–93 
(1995).  Also, researchers are expected to acknowledge their biases and to realize that it is 
impossible not to bring in any subjectivities to the research process. Id.; see also Richard 
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Second, beyond merely reassuring the critics, the inclusion of nonfiction 
narratives derived from empirical qualitative social science research serves 
to fulfill an important imperative of critical legal theory scholarship—it 
amplifies the voices of the marginalized.  As one critical legal theory 
founder, Professor Mari Matsuda, has observed, “[l]ooking to the bottom—
adopting the perspective of those who have seen and felt [the injustices or 
inequalities that one is studying] can assist critical scholars in the task of 
fathoming the phenomenology of law and defining the elements of 
justice.”19 
To start to grasp the devastating effects of the collateral legal 
consequences of conviction on women, consider this hypothetical scenario 
that combines the typical experiences of many incarcerated women:  Julie is 
a single mother who is addicted to crystal methamphetamines.20  She 
initially started taking the drug because she found that it gave her the extra 
energy to work long hours as a waitress to provide for herself and her son.  
She subsequently became romantically involved with her drug dealer, 
Michael, who would supply her with the drug for free. One Sunday 
evening, the DEA raids Julie’s apartment on an anonymous tip that her 
boyfriend, who the DEA knows to be a drug dealer, is using the apartment 
as a lab.  The DEA does not find Michael but while searching Julie, they 
discover a small amount of the drug.  They offer Julie immunity in 
exchange for her cooperation in a sting operation to arrest Michael.  She 
refuses and, as a result, she is charged with possession of a controlled 
substance and endangering the life of a minor (because she admitted to 
using the drug in the home she shares with her two-year-old son).  She 
pleads guilty and when she is sentenced, the judge tells her that he is 
disgusted that a mother would choose to use drugs and orders the maximum 
sentence possible.21  She is sent to prison for twenty-six months.  After 
serving fifteen months of her sentence, she learns that her son, who entered 
the foster system the day she was arrested, is now eligible for adoption 
pursuant to the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 199722 (ASFA).  Once 
she is released from prison, she must deal with the emotional blow of 
 
Delgado, On Telling Stories in School:  A Reply to Farber and Sherry, 46 VAND. L. REV. 
665, 670 (1993) (“Majoritarians tell stories . . . but with the conviction that they are not 
stories at all, but the truth.”).  The counter stories told by critical race theorists are necessary 
because the “destruction of contingent, comforting myths is often a necessary prelude to 
constructing a better, fairer world.” Id. at 671. 
 19. Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom:  Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 324 (1987). 
 20. Forty-five percent of individuals who entered methamphetamine treatment in 2003 
were women.  Female methamphetamine users are more likely than male users to be single 
parents who live alone with their children. CATHLEEN OTERO ET AL., NAT’L CTR. ON 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE & CHILD WELFARE, METHAMPHETAMINE ADDICTION, TREATMENT, AND 
OUTCOMES:  IMPLICATIONS FOR CHILD WELFARE WORKERS (2006), available at 
http://www.ncsacw.samhsa.gov/files/Meth%20and%20Child%20Safety.pdf. 
 21. See ANGELA J. HATTERY & EARL SMITH, PRISONER REENTRY AND SOCIAL CAPITAL:  
THE LONG ROAD TO REINTEGRATION 66–67 (2010) (noting that women receive more severe 
sentences than men for drug offenses). 
 22. Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (allowing children who are in foster care for 
fifteen months out of a twenty-two–month period to be placed for adoption). 
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having lost all parental rights to her son who has been adopted, while 
maintaining the focus to continue drug addiction treatment and find 
permanent housing.  She also finds that although she completed her general 
education degree (GED) while incarcerated, due to her status as a felon, she 
is now ineligible to work as a nurse, a career path she was contemplating 
before her incarceration.  She is also now unable to work for her former 
employer because he has an application form that requires applicants to 
confess whether they have been convicted of a felony.  She is despondent 
about her future and unable to contemplate where and how she will live 
after her stay at the short-term women’s shelter since her drug conviction 
makes her vulnerable to denials of both private and public housing, and 
because her conviction makes her ineglible for food stamps.  She restarts a 
relationship with Michael in order to avoid becoming homeless and before 
long she starts using drugs again. 
Unfortunately, Julie’s story is not unique.  This Article details how many 
formerly incarcerated women find themselves inordinately burdened with 
legal penalties they continue to face even after they have served their prison 
sentences.  Part I of this Article provides a brief overview of the origin and 
rationale behind collateral legal consequences and argues that they have 
stigmatizing and exclusionary effects similar to those of the “scarlet letter” 
described in Nathaniel Hawthorne’s novel depicting punishment in colonial 
America.23  Part II of this Article explicates Professor Kimberlé Crenshaw’s 
legal concept of “intersectionality” and discusses the various predominant 
intersectional identities that formerly incarcerated women embody, 
including their status as (1) women, (2) primary caregivers, (3) victims of 
domestic violence and sexual abuse, and (4) racial minorities.  Part III of 
this Article illuminates how these intersectional identities compound the 
impact of collateral legal consequences with a focus on four key arenas in 
which these collateral legal consequences come into play:  (1) government 
aid, (2) employment, (3) education, and (4) family ties.  Part IV argues that 
formerly incarcerated women are particularly “vulnerable subjects” and 
that, following Martha Fineman’s theory of the “responsive state,” the 
government has an affirmative obligation both to abrogate laws that serve to 
impede women’s reintegration into society and to enact new laws and 
policies that would facilitate women’s reentry.  Finally, Part V of this 
article urges a rethinking of the existing model of reentry and argues that 
the male-oriented model of operation for reentry organizations (many of 
which are federally subsidized) fails to take into account the intersectional 
identities of formerly incarcerated women and is therefore inadequate in 
effectuating their reentry into society. 
I propose a model of reentry that is cognizant of the differing needs of 
formerly incarcerated women, arising from their intersecting identities.  
Such a model would be better designed to accommodate the exigencies that 
are intrinsic to the identities.  I conclude that it serves the interests of 
society for formerly incarcerated women to be enabled to reintegrate 
 
 23. See HAWTHORNE, supra note 1. 
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successfully.  Thus, the government should carefully consider whether its 
current policies are serving to make society safer by ensuring that all 
members have a chance at upward mobility; or whether the opposite result 
is achieved. 
I.   COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES AS THE MODERN DAY SCARLET LETTER 
Because of their stigmatizing effects, the collateral legal consequences of 
criminal conviction have come to represent a modern day scarlet letter for 
formerly incarcerated women.24  A collateral legal consequence of criminal 
conviction is defined as:  “a [legal] penalty, disability, or disadvantage, 
however denominated, imposed on an individual as a result of the 
individual’s conviction of an offense . . . whether or not the penalty, 
disability, or disadvantage is included in . . . the sentence.”25  The collateral 
legal consequences of criminal conviction also have been referred to as: 
punishment that is accomplished through the diminution of the rights and 
privileges of citizenship and legal residency in the United 
States . . . . [t]hrough judicial interpretation, legislative fiat, and legal 
classification, these forms of punishment have been defined as “civil” 
rather than criminal in nature, as “disabilities” rather than punishments, as 
the “collateral consequences” of criminal convictions rather than the 
direct results.26 
With some variation across the different states, collateral legal 
consequences of criminal conviction include:  restrictions on employment 
and occupational licenses, denials of public and private housing, 
ineligibility for public benefits, blocked access to legal immigration, limited 
access to federal educational grants and both federal and private loans, and 
potential loss of parental rights.27  As statutes that determine collateral legal 
 
 24. See Deborah N. Archer & Kele S. Williams, Making America “The Land of Second 
Chances”:  Restoring Socioeconomic Rights for Ex-Offenders, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 527, 527 (2006) (asserting that “virtually every felony conviction carries with it a 
life sentence” because of the effects of the collateral legal consequences that continue to 
punish and stigmatize the individual long after their prison sentence has been completed); 
Ann Cammett, Expanding Collateral Sanctions:  The Hidden Costs of Aggressive Child 
Support Enforcement Against Incarcerated Parents, 13 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 313, 
319 (2006) (“Collateral sanctions, particularly against people with drug convictions, affect 
poor people almost exclusively . . . sanctions themselves deprive formerly incarcerated 
people of opportunities to lift themselves out of poverty.”); Loïc Wacquant, The New 
‘Peculiar Institution’:  On the Prison As Surrogate Ghetto, 4 THEORETICAL CRIM. 377, 384 
(2000) (describing social discrimination, incarceration, and the preceding collateral 
consequences as a “closed circuit” of perpetual marginality). 
 25. See UNIF. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT §§ 2(1)–(2) (2010), 
available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/collateral_consequences/ 
uccca_final_10.pdf. 
 26. See Jeremy Travis, Invisible Punishment:  An Instrument of Social Exclusion, in 
INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT:  THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 15–16 
(Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002). 
 27. See Collateral Consequences, SENTENCING PROJECT, 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/template/page.cfm?id=143 (last visited Apr. 23, 2015). 
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consequences differ from state to state,28 this Article will focus on federally 
sanctioned collateral consequences such as the ones that apply to federal 
public housing, employment, federal loans for education, and the ASFA.29  
Prior to the discussion of how the stigmatization effects of collateral legal 
consequences represent a modern day scarlet letter for formerly 
incarcerated women, it is important to understand the historical roots, as 
well as the accepted criminological theories that undergird this practice. 
A.   The Rationale for Shaming As a Recidivism Reduction Tool 
The roots of collateral legal consequences lie both in American 
puritanical history and in the more recent theories regarding the 
reintegration of formerly incarcerated people.  Consider Nathaniel 
Hawthorne’s novel, The Scarlet Letter,30 based on historical records of 
colonial America.  A young presumed widow, Hester Prynne, is punished 
for her crime of adultery by being forced to wear a scarlet letter “A” at all 
times; an act designed to shame her.31  This shaming does not serve to 
reintegrate her into society; rather she is shunned by her fellow villagers 
and is forced to live on the margins of their town.32  Prynne manages to eke 
out a meager living for herself and her illegitimate daughter, Pearl, but she 
must soon steel herself to fight the overtures of the villagers to remove her 
daughter because of Prynne’s perceived pernicious influence.33 
The shaming of individuals convicted of a crime, like in The Scarlet 
Letter, is a practice that persists in modern day America.  The criminologist 
John Braithwaite put forth a theory of reintegration in his book, Crime, 
Shame and Reintegration,34 that now serves as a template for punishment in 
America.35  Borrowing from sociological theories like labeling and control, 
 
 28. In 2003, the American Bar Association (ABA) established a new chapter of its 
Criminal Justice Standards that called on each U.S. jurisdiction to collect and analyze the 
collateral legal consequences in its laws and regulations. See ABA STANDARDS FOR 
COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS 
§ 19-2.1 (2003).  The ABA standards made a distinction between two types of collateral 
consequences:  (1) “collateral sanctions,” defined as penalties imposed automatically upon 
conviction; and (2) “discretionary disqualifications” defined as penalties that are authorized 
but not required to be imposed. Id. § 19-1.1.  Although this Article chooses not to make this 
distinction, because an individual may be subject to either type of consequence without 
notice or process, this distinction is present in a uniform law adopted by the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), and also section 510 of 
the Court Security Act, both of which also call for a comprehensive study of collateral legal 
consequences. See ABA, INTERNAL EXILE:  COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION IN 
FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS 9 (2009). 
 29. For a comprehensive overview of federal statutes that impose collateral legal 
consequences upon conviction, see Federal Statutes Imposing Collateral Consequences 
upon Conviction, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/pardon/ 
collateral_consequences.pdf (last visited Apr. 23, 2015). 
 30. HAWTHORNE, supra note 1. 
 31. Id. at 46. 
 32. Id. at 68. 
 33. Id. at 90–97. 
 34. JOHN BRAITHEWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 1–5 (1989). 
 35. In North America, the growth of restorative justice in which reintegrative shaming is 
practiced has been facilitated by NGOs dedicated to this approach to justice. See Daniel W. 
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Braithwaite asserts that high rates of violent crime within a society indicate 
the society’s failure to adequately shame the perpetrators of crime.36  
According to Braithwaite, making individuals feel guilty for crimes they 
have committed deters them from committing further crime.37  His proposal 
harkens back to a traditional view of crime as an opportunity to reinforce 
societal norms. 
The theory that shaming could be redemptive seems to run counter to 
human experience—shaming is, by its nature, isolating and alienating.  
Hawthorne’s story of the condemned woman who never regains her place in 
society is archetypical of stigmatization arising from crime.  The Scarlet 
Letter illustrates that continued shaming and societal reintegration are 
mutually exclusive. 
Braithewaite’s theory of reintegration is, however, not entirely devoid of 
merit.  At the core of Braithwaite’s theory is the belief that ties to family 
and community deter crime because would-be criminals, in anticipating that 
their tight-knit family or community would have an adverse reaction to their 
criminal action, would choose to forgo the criminal act.38  The question is 
whether shaming is the best way to enforce this loyalty to family and 
community, and ultimately, whether shaming is the best way to reduce 
recidivism. Other scholars have criticized Braithwaite’s theories regarding 
crime and recidivism for failing to adequately take into account 
environmental factors such as structural inequality39 and systemic 
injustice.40  A fundamental assumption of Braithwaite’s theory is that lack 
of shame causes crime, but as sociologists and social psychologists have 
argued, crime can be a rational act driven by societal factors.41  For 
example, an individual that is shut out from societally accepted methods of 
earning money because of lack of opportunities for social mobility or 
 
Van Ness, North America, in HANDBOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 512 (Gerry Johnstone & 
Daniel W. Van Ness eds., 2007). 
 36. BRAITHEWAITE, supra note 34, at 105. 
 37. Id. at 75.  This is similar to Émile Durkheim’s view of crime, now viewed as a major 
influence on the later developed sociological theory of “control.”  Durkheim argued that 
stronger social control among individuals of the Catholic faith was what resulted in their 
lower rates of suicide in comparison to those of the Protestant faith. ÉMILE DURKHEIM, ON 
SUICIDE 156, 163 (Robin Buss trans., 1897). 
 38. BRAITHEWAITE, supra note 34, at 56–57. 
 39. See Toni M. Massaro, The Meanings of Shame:  Implications for Legal Reform, 3 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 645, 678 (1997); see also Gabrielle Maxwell & Allison Morris, 
The Role of Shame, Guilt, and Remorse in Restorative Justice Processes for Young People, 
in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE:  THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 267 (Elmar G.M. Weitekamp & 
Hans-Jürgen Kerner eds., 2002). 
 40. See Bonnie Price Lofton, Does Restorative Justice Challenge Systematic Injustices?, 
in CRITICAL ISSUES IN RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 381 (Howard Zehr & Barb Toews eds., 2004). 
 41. See CARL HART, HIGH PRICE:  A NEUROSCIENTIST’S JOURNAL OF SELF-DISCOVERY 
THAT CHALLENGES EVERYTHING YOU KNOW ABOUT DRUGS AND SOCIETY 266–75 (2013) 
(demonstrating through clinical studies with drug addicts conducted at Columbia University 
that the use of illicit drugs is a rational choice driven by societal factors). 
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discrimination may feel compelled to resort to criminal activities to attain 
the same standard of living that she views others enjoying.42 
More recently, the criminologists Dina R. Rose and Todd R. Clear have 
found in their research that robust ties to the community—that include 
supportive networks—provide a deterrence to crime.43  Rose and Clear also 
discovered that the act of “shaming” the perpetrators of crime with long 
prison sentences tended to destroy the very networks and ties to community 
that would deter future crime, thus resulting in high recidivism rates.44  
Similarly, rather than serving to reintegrate formerly incarcerated women, 
modern “shaming” of those individuals by the assignation of collateral legal 
consequences, many of which endure for life, operate to drive those 
individuals to the margins of society. 
A study of prisoner reentry45 discovered that people who are incarcerated 
at a young age have a high likelihood of returning to prison in their adult 
years.  Furthermore, the study tied this high recidivism rate to the persisting 
stigma of incarceration.46  Many formerly incarcerated individuals find 
themselves limited in their ability to enter professional fields or to obtain 
the funding for higher education, which is one way that collateral legal 
consequences can restrict social mobility and foster social 
marginalization.47  Despite evidence of the ineffectiveness of shaming as a 
method of reducing recidivism, collateral legal consequences that 
negatively discriminate against formerly incarcerated individuals continue 
to enjoy legal support.48 
B.   The Collateral Damage of the War on Drugs 
Although statutes imposing collateral legal consequences have long been 
a part of the history of American punishment49 and have withstood several 
legal challenges,50 many more of those statutes have been enacted since the 
 
 42. See, e.g., SUDHIR VENKATESH, GANG LEADER FOR A DAY:  A ROGUE SOCIOLOGIST 
TAKES TO THE STREETS 27–35 (2008) (noting that gang leaders who engage in criminal 
activities like drug dealing believe that they have been shut out of socially accepted 
structures for earning a high income). 
 43. See Dina R. Rose & Todd R. Clear, Incarceration, Social Capital, and Crime:  
Implications for Social Disorganization Theory, 36 CRIMINOLOGY 441 (1998) (asserting a 
social disorganization theory in which mass incarceration weakens community ties and 
diminishes the social and cultural capital within a community thereby leading to less 
informal social control and more crime). 
 44. See id. at 491. 
 45. JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME:  PAROLE AND PRISONER REENTRY 
(2003). 
 46. Id. at 224. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See, e.g., Sutton v. McIlhany, 1 Ohio Dec. Reprint 235, 236 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1848) 
(acknowledging the importance of collateral consequences as part of criminal conviction); 
see also Turner v. Glickman, 207 F.3d 419, 430–31 (7th Cir. 2000) (upholding the 
constitutionality of collateral consequences). 
 49. See, e.g., Sutton, 1 Ohio Dec. Reprint at 236. 
 50. See Turner, 207 F.3d at 423, 426–27, 431; see also People v. Boespflug, 107 P.3d 
1118, 1121 (Colo. App. 2004) (dismissing defendant’s argument that “he should be allowed 
to withdraw his pleas because the court did not advise him that he would lose his right to 
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beginning of the War on Drugs in the 1980s,51 and their effects have been 
exacerbated by harsher charges and longer sentences.52 
New developments in the laws against drug possession and sale are 
important factors driving the increase of incarcerated women and the rise in 
new collateral legal consequences.  These developments include longer 
mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses53 and harsher and longer 
lasting collateral legal consequences, such as the legalized lifetime 
exclusion of felons from certain professional jobs54 and the denial of federal 
loans for education.55 
 
vote while he was imprisoned”); Henry v. State, No. 207, 2003 Del. LEXIS 507, at *1, *6 
(Del. Oct. 7, 2003) (rejecting defendant’s request to withdraw a nolo contendere plea based 
on counsel’s failure to “inform him of the possible revocation of his Mortgage Loan Broker 
License”); Slater v. State, 880 So. 2d 802, 803 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (rejecting 
defendant’s claim that “the trial judge should have set aside his pleas of no contest because 
the sentencing court and his attorney failed to advise him that as a result of a plea, his 
parental rights would be terminated”); State v. Wilkinson, No. 20365, 2005 WL 182920, at 
*1 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2005) (denying defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas 
because he was not informed that his pleas could “preclude him from any future employment 
at any facility that provides care to older adults,” and could also “jeopardize his nursing 
license”); Gonzalez v. State, 83 P.3d 921, 923–25 (Or. Ct. App. 2004) (involving a 
successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim stemming from counsel’s failure to 
adequately warn of collateral deportation consequences); Commonwealth v. Duffey, 639 
A.2d 1174, 1175 (Pa. 1994) (rebuffing defendant’s claim that his plea was invalid because 
he was not told that his license would be suspended); Ames v. Johnson, No. CL04-413, 2005 
WL 820305, at *3 (Va. Cir. Ct. Mar. 28, 2005) (concluding that trial counsel’s failure to 
warn of civil commitment collateral consequence did not violate defendant’s right to 
effective assistance of counsel); State v. Merten, 668 N.W.2d 750, 753–55 (Wis. Ct. App. 
2003) (refusing defendant’s request to withdraw a plea due to trial court’s failure to warn of 
resulting denial of Medicare and Medicaid benefits). 
 51. See Archer & Williams, supra note 24, at 530 (noting that the disproportionate 
impact of collateral consequences on drug offenders “creat[e] an absurd result:  ex-offenders 
convicted of rape or murder are nonetheless eligible for a number of rights denied to drug 
offenders”); see also Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions:  
Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 461 (2010) (noting that 
“collateral consequences have increased in number, scope, and severity since the 1980s”). 
 52. See Sentencing Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (abolishing federal 
parole). 
 53. See id. (creating a sentencing disparity of 100 to 1 for crack versus powder cocaine, 
which has been shown to disproportionately impact racial minorities and the poor); Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (instituting mandatory 
minimum sentences for drug crimes on the mere basis of the quantity of drugs recovered). 
But see Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (reducing the 
crack versus powder cocaine sentencing disparity to 18 to 1).  In August of 2013, Attorney 
General Eric Holder, announced that the Department of Justice will help certain drug 
offenders, who have no ties to large-scale organizations, gangs, or cartels, avoid harsh 
mandatory minimum sentences. See Ryan J. Reilly, DOJ to Nix Mandatory Minimum 
Sentences in Some Pending Drug Cases:  Eric Holder, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 19, 2013), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/19/mandatory-minimum-sentences-doj-eric-
holder_n_3956409.html. 
 54. Federal law automatically excludes felons from serving or continuing to serve as a 
law enforcement officer, without exception. See 5 U.S.C. § 7371 (2012).  Persons wishing to 
serve as airport security screeners or who need access to secure areas of an airport must not 
have been convicted of a wide variety of felonies during the previous ten years. See 49 
U.S.C. § 44936(b)(1)(B) (2012).  Similar restrictions exist for persons whose employment 
requires a Transportation Worker Identification Credential. See 46 U.S.C. § 70105 (2012).  
Merchant mariners also must not have been convicted of certain enumerated offenses, 
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Women are especially affected by the collateral legal consequences 
stemming from a drug conviction, as incarcerated women are more likely to 
be convicted of a drug offense than their male counterparts.56  In fact, 
convictions for nonviolent drug felonies and property offenses account for 
nearly 80 percent of the female inmate population.57  Gender disparities in 
sentencing for drug crimes also play a factor in how women experience the 
collateral legal consequences of conviction.  Studies have shown that 
women convicted of a drug offense receive harsher sentences than similarly 
situated men.58  These statistics are significant because of the developments 
in the drug laws that impose harsh collateral legal consequences on 
individuals convicted of drug felonies.59  Thus, a significant percentage of 
formerly incarcerated women, because they have been convicted of a drug 
crime, face government-imposed restrictions on affordable housing and 
welfare,60 employment,61 and the pursuit of higher education.62  Collateral 
legal consequences represent a herculean hurdle that formerly incarcerated 
women must surmount in their bid to reintegrate into society.  Next, I detail 
how the intersectional identities of women exacerbate this particularly 
difficult task. 
II.   INTERSECTIONALITY AND COMPOUND IDENTITIES 
The laws that allow for collateral legal consequences are facially neutral; 
that is, they make no notice of gender.  However, it should not be 
overlooked that the intersectional identities of formerly incarcerated women 
serve to intensify the negative impact of those consequences.  Legal 
activists and scholars have long recognized circumstances in which a law of 
general applicability is nonetheless shown to have a discriminatory effect or 
 
including federal “dangerous drug laws.” See id. §§ 7703–7704.  Airman certificates can be 
revoked for certain convictions, particularly those involving drugs. See 14 C.F.R. § 61.15 
(2014). 
 55. See Students with Criminal Convictions Have Limited Eligibility for Federal Student 
Aid, FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.ed.gov/eligibility/criminal-convictions (last visited 
Apr. 23, 2015). 
 56. Meda Chesney-Lind, Imprisoning Women:  The Unintended Victims of Mass 
Imprisonment, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT:  THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS 
IMPRISONMENT 15, 84 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002). 
 57. Women in Prison Project, Women in Prison Fact Sheet, CORR. ASS’N OF N.Y. 
(2006), http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/Fact_Sheets_2002.pdf. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Gabriel J. Chin, Race, the War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences of 
Criminal Conviction, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 253, 259 (2002) (observing that “drug 
offenses are subjected to more and harsher collateral consequences than any other category 
of crime”). 
 60. Travis, supra note 26, at 15–16. 
 61. MARGARET COLGATE LOVE & SUSAN M. KUZMA, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF 
THE PARDON ATTORNEY, CIVIL DISABILITIES OF CONVICTED FELONS:  A STATE-BY-STATE 
SURVEY 6–10 (1996); PETERSILIA, supra note 45, at 19–20. 
 62. PATRICIA ALLARD, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, LIFE SENTENCES:  DENYING WELFARE 
BENEFITS TO WOMEN CONVICTED OF DRUG OFFENSES 17 (2002), available at 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/women_lifesentences.pdf. 
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indeed is revealed to purposefully target a subset of the population that 
share a disadvantaged identity.63 
An early canonical case in which a facially neutral law was found to be 
discriminatory in effect is that of Yick Wo v. Hopkins.64  In that case, the 
Court struck down a San Francisco ordinance that sought to curtail the 
operation of laundries in wooden buildings.  The ordinance 
disproportionately affected people of Chinese descent as 95 percent of the 
city’s 320 laundries were operated in wooden buildings and Chinese 
immigrants owned two-thirds of those wooden laundry buildings.65  Of 
course, the reach of Yick Wo was limited.  Even after Yick Wo, the Court in 
Plessy v. Ferguson66 upheld laws that discriminated against African 
Americans by asserting a “separate but equal”67 standard that allowed for 
legal segregation until it was overturned by the Brown v. Board of 
Education68 decision in 1954.  Both cases involved instances when racial 
animus or the intent to discriminate on racial grounds could be shown.  The 
plaintiff who alleges no discriminatory intent, but rather “disparate 
impact”69 and/or disproportionate impact based on grounds other than 
race,70 faces a much more arduous path to effectuating redress.71 
Intersectionality as a feminist sociological theory was first highlighted by 
Deborah King, who referred to a “double jeopardy” arising from a woman 
question and a race problem.72  Kimberlé Crenshaw73 and Patricia Hill 
 
 63. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
 64. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
 65. Id. at 358–59. 
 66. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 67. Id. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 68. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 69. See McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291–92 (1987) (holding that racially 
discriminatory impact of death penalty as shown by comprehensive study is not enough to 
overturn verdict without a showing of a racially discriminatory purpose); Vill. of Arlington 
Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–70 (1977) (establishing the disparate 
impact test wherein the challenging party bears the burden of demonstrating that the law in 
question:  (1) affects a protected class in greater proportion, and (2) was created with the 
intent or purpose to discriminate against the protected class); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 
229, 239 (1976) (finding that laws that have a racially discriminatory impact but which do 
not have a racially discriminatory purpose are not unconstitutional). 
 70. See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273–74 (1979) (holding that a 
gender-neutral law with an exclusionary impact on women is not unconstitutional absent a 
showing of discriminatory purpose). But see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 
(1971) (establishing that pursuant to Title VII, an employer must provide a business 
necessity justification for the use of a test that has a disparate impact on a protected class). In 
1991, Congress amended Title VII to codify the “disparate impact test” established by 
Griggs. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. 
 71. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 594–95 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(implying Title VII’s disparate impact provision is unconstitutional); id. at 609 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (raising the issue of whether the holding in Ricci has effectively overruled 
Griggs); see also infra Part III (offering a brief discussion of how the disproportionate 
gendered effects of collateral legal consequences might be challenged on the equal 
protection doctrine). 
 72. See generally Deborah K. King, Multiple Jeopardy, Multiple Consciousness:  The 
Context of a Black Feminist Ideology, 14 SIGNS 42, 42 (1988). 
 73. See generally Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:  Intersectionality, Identity 
Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991). 
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Collins74 then articulated the legal realities of intersectionality.  Crenshaw 
popularized the legal concept in an attempt to contextualize the double and 
intersecting discrimination that Black women endure as a result of their 
dual identities as women and as racial minorities.75  However, the concept 
has evolved into a methodology employed in both critical legal studies76 
and empirical social science research to aid the examination of how social 
and cultural categories such as gender, race, class, disability, and other 
facets of identity interact on multiple and often simultaneous levels, to 
contribute to systematic social inequality.77  Even in the matter of legal 
redress, the negative effect of intersectionality is documented by a study 
showing that legal plaintiffs who bring discrimination claims are 
disadvantaged when they reveal their intersectional identities.78 
 
 74. Patricia Hill Collins, Gender, Black Feminism, and Black Political Economy, 568 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 41 (2000); Patricia Hill Collins, Learning from the 
Outsider Within:  The Sociological Significance of Black Feminist Thought, 33 SOC. PROBS. 
S14 (1986); Patricia Hill Collins, The Tie That Binds:  Race, Gender and US Violence, 21 
ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 917 (1998). 
 75. Crenshaw, supra note 73, at 1242–43 (explaining that women of color are at the 
intersection of race and gender oppression); see also Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Panel 
Presentation on Cultural Battery, Speaker:  Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, 25 U. TOL. L. 
REV. 891, 892 (1995) (“Intersectionality generally functions as a metaphor for capturing the 
different dimensions of race and gender as they converge in the lives of women of color.”). 
 76. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race 
Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1775 (2003) (asserting that intersectionality “conveys at least 
the following two ideas:  (1) that our identities are intersectional—that is, raced, gendered, 
sexually oriented, etc.—and (2) that our vulnerability to discrimination is a function of our 
specific intersectional identities”); Frank Rudy Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity:  
Intersectionality, Assimilation, Identity Performance, and Hierarchy, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
853, 860–74 (2006) (applying intersectionality theory to heterosexual Black men); Emily 
M.S. Houh, Toward Praxis, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 905, 924–38 (2006) (operationalizing 
anti-essentialism and intersectionality in a sexual harassment hypothetical); Gowri 
Ramachandran, Intersectionality As “Catch-22”:  Why Identity Performance Demands Are 
Neither Harmless nor Reasonable, 69 ALB. L. REV. 299, 301 (2005) (discussing the double 
bind of “intersectionals,” defined as “persons who are members of more than one ‘low-
status’ category, such as women of color, queer persons of color, or indigent women”); 
Catherine Smith, Queer As Black Folk?, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 379, 381 n.4 (“The experiences 
for black heterosexual women in interracial relationships are also different than those of 
black lesbians and black men in interracial relationships.”). 
 77. For a pioneering example of how the concept of intersectionality has been employed 
in legal research to illuminate overlooked disadvantaged identities, see generally Angela 
Onwuachi-Willig & Jacob Willig-Onwuachi, A House Divided:  The Invisibility of the 
Multiracial Family, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 231 (2009) (calling for housing 
discrimination statutes to explicitly recognize “interraciality” as a protected category because 
“interraciality” (as in the case of an interracial couple or multiracial family) is a 
disadvantaged identity that renders an individual particularly vulnerable to housing 
discrimination). See also Leslie McCall, The Complexity of Intersectionality, 30 SIGNS 1771 
(2005) (noting that intersectionality has introduced new methodological issues). 
 78. See Rachel Best et al., Multiple Disadvantages: An Empirical Test of 
Intersectionality Theory in EEO Litigation, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 991, 991 (2011) (finding 
that both intersectional demographic characteristics and legal claims are associated with 
dramatically reduced odds of plaintiff victory). 
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A.   The Intersectionality of Criminality and Gender 
Formerly incarcerated women embody various intersectional identities, 
but the most predominant of these identities is that of a woman who has 
been convicted of a crime.  Criminal women suffer from the double 
vulnerability of discrimination that comes from being both “criminal” and 
“female,” meaning that they experience negative differential treatment as a 
result of the convergence of gender bias and the stigma of having been in 
prison.79  As a result of the stigma surrounding femininity and crime, there 
are fewer reentry resources for formerly incarcerated women.  One 
groundbreaking study has identified seven major unmet needs of formerly 
incarcerated women: 
(1) treatment for substance abuse; 
(2) health care for serious medical problems; 
(3) treatment for serious mental health issues; 
(4) protection from abusive environments, and treatment for past, violent 
trauma; 
(5) educational and employment services; 
(6) safe and affordable housing; and 
(7) services to address family reunification needs.80 
Further, the study found three broad social and institutional contexts 
within which reentry barriers exist for women.  These contexts include:  
(1) the combined impact of the competing demands of the barriers to 
reentry—for example, a female parolee is expected to find employment as 
soon as possible even while she is trying to reconcile with her children; 
(2) the ill-equipped and deteriorating communities to which women return, 
and; (3) the additional gender, racial, and economic challenges specific to 
women of color.81 
B.   The Unequal Demands of Parenthood 
In addition to the stigma of female criminality, formerly incarcerated 
women are more greatly impacted by the demands of parenthood.  First, 
formerly incarcerated women must contend with undeniably distinct 
biological and social demands, particularly in regards to pregnancy, 
childbirth, and parenting.82  Second, women are more likely to be the 
primary caregivers of their minor children.  Approximately 75 to 80 percent 
 
 79. See Coramae Richey Mann, Minority and Female:  A Criminal Justice Double Bind, 
in AFRICAN AMERICAN CLASSICS IN CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 261 (Shaun 
Gabbidon et al. eds., 2002). 
 80. Beth E. Richie, Challenges Incarcerated Women Face As They Return to Their 
Communities:  Findings from Life History Interviews, 47 CRIME & DELINQ. 368, 371–79 
(2001). 
 81. Id. at 380–83. 
 82. SANDRA ENOS, MOTHERING FROM THE INSIDE:  PARENTING IN A WOMEN’S PRISON 
(2001); Barbara Bloom et al., Women Offenders and the Gendered Effects of Public Policy, 
21 REV. POL’Y RES. 31, 32–33 (2004). 
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of incarcerated women are mothers of minor children, with the incarcerated 
woman having an average of 2.11 children under the age of eighteen.83  
Further, the majority of incarcerated mothers, approximately 64 percent, 
lived with their minor children immediately prior to incarceration.84  As a 
result of these differences, there are disparities in outcomes for children 
when a mother is incarcerated versus when a father is sent to prison.  About 
10 percent of the children of incarcerated women are placed in foster care85 
which is in stark contrast to the 2 percent of the children of incarcerated 
men who end up in foster care.86  Thus, formerly incarcerated women are 
more likely to face the added challenge of losing legal custody of their 
children. 
One formerly incarcerated woman I interviewed articulates a situation 
that many formerly incarcerated women must confront upon release:  the 
loss of their children.  “Well, the many of the women maybe have lost their 
children . . . .  Often times jail is a reason why they lose their children.  
They may not have someone to go to take of them, so they are put into the 
foster care system.”87 
C.   Victims of Domestic Violence and Sexual Abuse 
Studies have shown that most incarcerated women, about 78 percent, 
were victims of abuse.88  Several studies have suggested a link between 
abuse and involvement in the criminal justice system,89 and in some cases, 
women are incarcerated because they were convicted of killing their 
abusive domestic partners.90  Other illicit behavior can derive from the 
abuse, including drug and alcohol use as a coping mechanism, or crimes 
such as property and financial crimes related to a desperate bid to escape 
the abusive partner.91 
The intersectional identity of domestic violence victim is particularly 
significant for formerly incarcerated women given that legal scholars have 
found that the criminal justice system does not respond adequately to 
 
 83. See HATTERY & SMITH, supra note 21, at 67; see also LAWRENCE A. GREENFIELD & 
TRACY L. SNELL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 175688, WOMEN OFFENDERS 8 
(1999), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/wo.pdf. 
 84. CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 182335, 
INCARCERATED PARENTS AND THEIR CHILDREN (2000), available at 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/iptc.pdf. 
 85. Id. at 1. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Interview with Female Respondent 130612_001 (June 12, 2013). 
 88. Kayleen A. Islam-Zwart & Peter W. Vik, Female Adjustment to Incarceration As 
Influenced by Sexual Assault History, 31 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 521, 522 (2004). 
 89. See, e.g., HATTERY & SMITH, supra note 21, at 47, 67; COAL. FOR WOMEN 
PRISONERS, COALITION FOR WOMEN PRISONERS’ 2006 PROPOSALS FOR REFORM (2006), 
available at http://www.correctionalassociation.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/ 
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 90. ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL 9–11 (1989); COAL. FOR WOMEN 
PRISONERS, supra note 89. 
 91. HATTERY & SMITH, supra note 21, at 67; COAL. FOR WOMEN PRISONERS, supra note 
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female victims of domestic violence.92  Thus, some formerly incarcerated 
women who confront a lack of housing opportunities93 upon their release 
from prison may have no recourse but to return to their abusers, leading to 
their recurrent victimization. 
Formerly incarcerated women are also more likely than men to have been 
victims of sexual abuse.94  Forty-four percent of female offenders report 
having been either sexually or physically assaulted and 69 percent report 
that the abuse took place before they were eighteen.95 
One formerly incarcerated woman I spoke with recounted her sexual 
abuse: 
My mother was a workaholic. She didn’t have time for me.  She had the 
people that were renting the house that she owned babysit me and it was a 
messed up environment.  Alcoholic environment.  You know, I believe I 
was sexually abused in that house, I was so young.  It was like kinda I 
could remember up to a certain point and then it was like and nothing.  
And when I’m older now and I can look back and try to put the pieces, it 
all kinda makes sense.  Can’t prove it, but I’m pretty sure.96 
D.   Racial Minorities 
In addition to the intersection of the stigma of incarceration and sexism, 
women of color have the added stigma of accompanying negative 
stereotypes97 and are subject to the racial biases that have been found to 
permeate the legal system.98  Black women are three times more likely to 
be incarcerated than white women and twice as likely as Hispanic women.99 
These racial discrepancies persist after incarceration.  For example, Black 
children of incarcerated mothers are more likely to be in foster care than 
their counterparts, making regaining custody of their children much harder 
for formerly incarcerated Black women.100  Some legal scholars have 
identified an intersectionality centered around race, gender, and reentry and 
have made the argument that African American women, because of their 
 
 92. See, e.g., Kimberly D. Bailey, Lost in Translation:  Domestic Violence, “The 
Personal Is Political,” and the Criminal Justice System, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
1255 (2010) (arguing that the criminal justice system is ineffective for addressing domestic 
violence as it fails to account for the social, political, and economic factors involved in such 
cases). 
 93. The housing limitations that formerly incarcerated women face are discussed infra 
Part III.A. 
 94. See generally LESLIE ACOCA & KELLY DEDEL, NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQ., 
NO PLACE TO HIDE:  UNDERSTANDING AND MEETING THE NEEDS OF GIRLS IN THE CALIFORNIA 
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM (1998), available at http://www.nccdglobal.org/sites/default/files/ 
publication_pdf/no-place-to-hide.pdf. 
 95. GREENFIELD & SNELL, supra note 83, at 8. 
 96. Interview with Female Respondent 130410 (Apr. 10, 2013). 
 97. See Jyoti Nanda, Blind Discretion:  Girls of Color & Delinquency in the Juvenile 
Justice System, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1502, 1520–21 (2012). 
 98. Mann, supra note 79. 
 99. See U.S.:  World’s Leading Jailer, New Numbers Show, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 11, 
2008), http://www.hrw.org/news/2008/12/10/us-world-s-leading-jailer-new-numbers-show. 
 100. See DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS:  THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 210–11 
(2002). 
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gender and race, are the most disproportionately impacted by the collateral 
legal consequences of criminal conviction.101 
III.   FOUR KEY ARENAS OF LEGAL DISCRIMINATION 
The arenas of legal discrimination I chose to focus on were derived both 
from my literature review of prior reentry studies and from my interviews 
with the formerly incarcerated women.  Contrary to the stereotype of 
disadvantaged subjects who are oblivious to their marginalized social 
positions, many of these women were socially and politically aware.  One 
formerly incarcerated woman astutely summarized the disadvantages 
women in her situation face: 
So you know, I know the money goes and follows where the greatest need 
is and somebody has said that it’s men.  But women are the caretakers of 
the kids, women when they are released are less likely to be employed 
than men because our demographics show that most are [or] have been in 
poverty.  Don’t have a high school degree, have had numerous issues and 
barriers—whether that be culturally, socially, economically—have mental 
health, historically have a familial history or culture of poverty and that 
cycle of abuse, neglect, mental health issues, substance abuse 
issues . . . where you often don’t see, that doesn’t happen as many times 
with men.102 
A.   Government Aid:  Food and Housing 
Ironically, the human comforts that a formerly incarcerated woman needs 
most, like food and housing, may be out of reach once she is released from 
prison.  The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act of 1996103 (PRWORA) denies government aid, including federally 
subsidized housing and food stamps, to individuals convicted of drug 
offenses.  While states may opt out of the provisions of the Act, currently, 
there are more states that comply with the ban than there are those that do 
not.104  This denial of housing has been shown to lead to crime.105 
One formerly incarcerated woman I interviewed described how the lack 
of housing played a role in her reincarceration. The need for housing left 
 
 101. See, e.g., Geneva Brown, The Wind Cries Mary—The Intersectionality of Race, 
Gender, and Reentry:  Challenges for African American Women, 24 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL 
COMMENT. 625 (2010); see also HATTERY & SMITH, supra note 21, at 68–69. 
 102. Interview with Female Respondent 130612_001 (June 12, 2013). 
 103. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996). 
 104. See MARC MAUER & VIRGINIA MCCALMONT, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, A LIFETIME 
OF PUNISHMENT:  THE IMPACT OF THE FELONY DRUG BAN ON WELFARE BENEFITS 2 (2013), 
available at http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/cc_A%20Lifetime%20of% 
20Punishment.pdf. 
 105. See George Lipsitz, “In an Avalanche Every Snowflake Pleads Not Guilty”:  
Collateral Consequences of Mass Incarceration and Impediments to Women’s Fair Housing 
Rights, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1746, 1754–56 (2012). 
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her with no choice but to seek refuge in an environment she knew was 
criminogenic106 and which facilitated her relapse as a recovering addict. 
The first time it happened . . . I had to go move back with Pops and a 
whole really drug-fulfilled environment, active addiction household.  
Yeah that was just all crazy.  It was just relapse then straight.  Relapse, 
straight.  Was in the treatment, went to transitional housing right over 
here across the street.  Relapsed.  Boom, straight back.107 
Clearly, the fact that this woman endured such Sisyphean efforts to stay 
sober demonstrates a willingness to rejoin society as a productive member.  
However, as she describes, her lack of housing, and the consequence of 
being forced to inhabit a household where drug use was pervasive, were 
factors that thwarted this woman’s will to reclaim her sobriety and stay out 
of legal trouble, no matter how many times she tried. 
B.   Employment 
The fact that formerly incarcerated women are less likely to have been 
employed prior to their period of incarceration has significant implications 
for reentry.108  Forty percent of women offenders were employed prior to 
their incarceration compared to 60 percent of their male counterparts.109  
This can be a challenge to successful reentry as other studies have 
demonstrated that employment serves to reduce recidivism among the 
formerly incarcerated.110  Furthermore, levels of compensation, a variable 
dependent on level of education, also influences reentry outcomes, as those 
making higher wages are less likely to recidivate.111  In addition to 
lowering recidivism rates, employment helps the formerly incarcerated 
reintegrate into society, as they are now able to financially support 
themselves and their families.112  Recent studies have explored the link 
 
 106. “Criminogenic” is an adjective which denotes “producing or leading to crime or 
criminality.” See Criminogenic, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 537 
(1986). 
 107. Interview with Female Respondent 130410 (Apr. 10, 2013). 
 108. See ACOCA & DEDEL, supra note 94, at 121. 
 109. GREENFIELD & SNELL, supra note 83, at 8. 
 110. See Robert J. Sampson & John L. Laub, A Life-Course Theory of Cumulative 
Disadvantage and the Stability of Delinquency, in 7 ADVANCES IN CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY 
1 (Terence P. Thornberry ed., 1997); Christopher Uggen, Work As a Turning Point in the 
Life Course of Criminals:  A Duration Model of Age, Employment, and Recidivism, 67 AM. 
SOC. REV. 529, 529–30 (2000); see also MILES D. HARER, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, OFFICE 
OF RESEARCH & EVALUATION, RECIDIVISM OF FEDERAL PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1987, at 4–5 
(1994), available at http://www.bop.gov/resources/research_projects/published_reports/ 
recidivism/oreprrecid87.pdf. 
 111. See CHRISTY VISHER ET AL., URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR., EMPLOYMENT AFTER 
PRISON:  A LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF RELEASEES IN THREE STATES 8 (2008), available at 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411778_employment_after_prison.pdf. 
 112. DIANA BRAZZELL ET AL., URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR., FROM THE CLASSROOM 
TO THE COMMUNITY:  EXPLORING THE ROLE OF EDUCATION DURING INCARCERATION AND 
REENTRY 17 (2009), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411963_classroom_ 
community.pdf. 
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between incarceration and employment rates, finding that spending time in 
prison disadvantages released criminal offenders.113 
Formerly incarcerated women are even more impacted by unemployment 
for various reasons.  For one, most formerly incarcerated women cannot fall 
back on many of the unskilled or semiskilled jobs that their male 
counterparts can.  Many other trade jobs or vocational jobs, such as being 
an electrician or welding require an apprenticeship and are socially closed 
off to women.114  Additionally, most “pink-collar” jobs that attract women 
such as nursing or teaching are subject to professional licenses and 
background checks that weigh negatively against people who have been 
convicted of a crime.115 
One woman I interviewed assessed the barriers stacked against her 
chances of finding employment: 
Well, jobs is pretty hard nowadays.  I was just talking to somebody about 
McDonald’s, and they go through, send you through an extensive 
background.  And just to work there.  And I worked at McDonald’s years 
ago and it wasn’t nothing like it is now. . . .  But I mean they have to 
know that there’s a lot of people that do go to prison and come out and 
that doesn’t mean that they’re a waste to society.  I mean.  People still 
have to make a living.  I still have to pay bills.  I still want to see my kid.  
I have to have a job to do that.116 
C.   Education 
In relation to employment, many scholars have found that education is 
important for the successful reentry of the formerly incarcerated.117  
Formerly incarcerated women discover, however, it is more difficult to 
 
 113. Becky Petit & Christopher Lyons, Status and the Stigma of Incarceration:  The 
Labor-Market Effects of Incarceration, by Race, Class, and Criminal Involvement, in 
BARRIERS TO RE-ENTRY? THE LABOR MARKET FOR RELEASED PRISONERS IN POSTINDUSTRIAL 
AMERICA 203, 223 (Shawn Bushway et al. eds., 2007). 
 114. See Vickie Elmer, Report:  Women Still Face Barriers in Construction Trades, 
WASH. POST (June 11, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/she-the-
people/wp/2014/06/11/report-women-still-face-barriers-in-construction-trades/ (noting that 
women still face barriers in entering construction trades). 
 115. See Elvis Michael, Can Certified Nursing Assistants with Felony Convictions Get 
Jobs?, HOUS. CHRON., http://work.chron.com/can-certified-nursing-assistants-felony-
convictions-jobs-26491.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2015) (explaining that a required 
background check would most likely disqualify an individual from becoming certified and 
registered in most states if he or she has a felony conviction).  In the state of Minnesota, a 
background check is required for persons offered employment by a K–12 school, including 
teachers and athletic and academic extracurricular activity coaches. See MINN. STAT. 
§ 123B.03 (2009). 
 116. Interview with Female Respondent 130710 (July 10, 2013). 
 117. See generally STEPHEN J. STEURER & LINDA G. SMITH, EDUCATION REDUCES CRIME:  
THREE-STATE RECIDIVISM STUDY EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2003); Bruce Western, The Penal 
System and the Labor Market, in BARRIERS TO RE-ENTRY? THE LABOR MARKET FOR 
RELEASED PRISONERS IN POSTINDUSTRIAL AMERICA 335 (Shawn Bushway et al. eds., 2007); 
Robert J. Sampson & W. Byron Groves, Community Structure and Crime:  Testing Social-
Disorganization Theory, 94 AM. J. SOC. 744 (1989); Gerald G. Gaes, The Impact of Prison 
Education on Post Release Outcomes, URBAN INST. JUSTICE POL’Y CENTER (2008), 
http://www.urban.org/projects/reentry-roundtable/upload/Gaes.pdf. 
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obtain higher education, after prison.  The federal government makes 
eligibility for student grants—including the Pell Grant which is for students 
from low-income backgrounds—and student loans contingent on the 
absence of a criminal record.118  Beginning in 1994, prisoners were 
declared ineligible for college Pell Grants, thus creating a nearly 
insurmountable financial hurdle for the formerly incarcerated individuals 
who would like to continue their education while in prison.119 
Although men bear a higher risk of incarceration, women are 
disproportionately impacted by the lack of educational programs in prison.  
While correctional institutions have increased the number of general 
education programs available to prisoners since the 1970s, as of 1996 only 
52 percent of correctional facilities for women offered post-secondary 
education.120  Avenues for financing higher education have become even 
restricted for the formerly incarcerated woman since the enactment of the 
1998 amendment to the Higher Education Act.121  Under this Act, 
individuals with drug convictions are prohibited from receiving federal 
financial aid to enroll in a post-secondary institution.122  During the 2000–
2001 school year, more than 43,000 college students were affected by the 
amendment.123 
Lack of access to education is a concern given that education has been 
shown to result in increased employment and reduced recidivism.124  
Education may be helpful in mitigating the stigma of incarceration that 
“marks” an individual as unfit for work125—as credentials and diplomas 
certify the formerly incarcerated individual’s hard work and ability for 
success.126 
Higher education also has been theorized as an important key to the 
reintegration of formerly incarcerated people as it provides greater access to 
social networks and social and cultural capital, intangibles which 
criminologists argue should help reduce recidivism.127  There is, however, a 
paucity of effective programs that enable formerly incarcerated women to 
obtain higher education.128 
One woman I interviewed spoke about her dissatisfaction with a prior 
reentry program that did not allow her to continue her education: 
 
 118. Richard Tewksbury et al., Opportunities Lost:  The Consequences of Eliminating 
Pell Grant Eligibility for Correctional Education Students, 31 J. OFFENDER REHABILITATION 
43, 44 (2000). 
 119. ALLARD, supra note 62, at 15. 
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Program Availability for Male and Female Offenders, 64 FED. PROBATION 39, 41 (2000). 
 121. Pub. L. No. 105-244, 112 Stat. 1581 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 
U.S.C.); ALLARD, supra note 62, at 17. 
 122. ALLARD, supra note 62, at 17. 
 123. Id. at 17. 
 124. See Gaes, supra note 117, at 3–4. 
 125. See Western, supra note 117, at 335. 
 126. See ALLARD, supra note 62, at 17. 
 127. See Rose & Clear, supra note 44; Sampson & Groves, supra note 117. 
 128. See Gaes, supra note 117. 
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Their concentration was on that you do their program which meant that 
since it was faith based that we spent a lot of time at church.  And not 
only that, they didn’t allow you to leave the building unless they agreed to 
why you were leaving the building.  So again, I felt like I was back in 
prison.  I told them that I had a need that I wanted to fulfill that was 
school.  That I wanted to continue my education because I was very 
excited to have my GED.  And you were not allowed to go to school or 
have a job in that shelter.129 
D.   Family Ties 
The loss of parental ties is another issue that negatively impacts the 
reintegration of formerly incarcerated women.  In 1997, the federal 
government enacted the Adoption and Safe Families Act with the stated 
goal of facilitating domestic adoptions.130  However, in practice, the ASFA 
has become a government-mandated push for the adoption of children who 
have been in foster care for fifteen months out of a twenty-two month 
period,131 thus negatively impacting incarcerated parents. Adoption rates 
have nearly doubled since the enactment of the ASFA.132  Since its 
enactment in 1997, the annual number of children leaving foster care for 
adoption has risen from roughly 30,000 to more than 50,000.133  The annual 
number of adoptions from foster care climbed from less than 30,000 in the 
mid-1990s, to a peak of some 57,000 in fiscal year 2009.134  Since then the 
number has remained at, or above, roughly 50,000.135  While this might be 
good news for children who would otherwise age out of the foster care 
system without ever having the security net and emotional stability afforded 
by a permanent family, this also means that fewer children are being 
reunited with their biological families. 
The adoption of many of these children is not really the best result given 
that said adoption is based on the length of an imposed prison sentence, 
rather than a true judgment of the suitability of the incarcerated parent to 
raise a child.  Furthermore, because women are more likely to be the 
principal guardians of minor children, many more formerly incarcerated 
women than men find themselves as parents with no parental rights to their 
biological children.136  As the average prison sentence exceeds twenty-two 
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 130. See Olivia Golden & Jennifer Macomber, The Adoption and Safe Families Act 
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 131. See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115. 
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 136. See MUMOLA, supra note 84, at 1 (nothing that about 64 percent of women in state 
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months, incarcerated parents dependent on the foster care system to care for 
their children risk losing custody.137  Therefore, loss of parental rights is of 
particular concern to mothers in prison, who are five times as likely as men 
to report having children placed in a foster home.138  One formerly 
incarcerated woman shared her thoughts with me regarding the other 
formerly incarcerated women she knew who had lost their children:  “Oh 
some of them are really depressed, angry, just so much because they’ve lost 
their children forever.  Their children have been adopted out through the 
system which makes it so they never will ever get their children back.  
Some of them won’t even know where their children are living.”139 
IV.   THE DUTY OF THE RESPONSIVE STATE 
The state has a duty to ensure that all members of its population enjoy the 
equal opportunity to strive for upward social mobility and that starts by 
redressing the inequalities it has created because of overlooked 
intersectional social identities.  I argue that the state’s “carceral burden”140 
goes beyond an individual’s tenure as a ward of the state while in prison.  I 
propose that the state’s carceral burden extends to when the former inmate 
is released and necessitates that the state affirmatively ensure that the 
individual is free to reintegrate back into society, without legally imposed 
fetters that would continue to hinder the individual’s economic and social 
progress. 
As my empirical research has shown, formerly incarcerated women 
represent particularly “vulnerable subjects” because of the manner in which 
their intersectional identities work to exacerbate the effects of the collateral 
legal consequences of criminal conviction.141  Thus, the state has an 
affirmative obligation, first, to reconsider the collateral legal consequences 
that serve to anchor formerly incarcerated women to a marginalized status, 
and second, to enact new laws and policies that would enable their social 
mobility. 
A.   Removing the Scarlet Letter 
To remove the scarlet letter from formerly incarcerated women, the 
government should ensure that institutional policies, particularly when it 
comes to housing, employment, and education, are not being used to 
“mark” and sort those individuals for negative discrimination.142  For 
 
 137. SARAH SCHIRMER, ASHLEY NELLIS & MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, 
INCARCERATED PARENTS AND THEIR CHILDREN:  TRENDS 1991–2007, at 9 (2009), available at 
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 140. See Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84 
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 141. See supra Part III. 
 142. EEOC Enforcement Guidance, EEOC (Apr. 25, 2012), 
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2015] THE MODERN DAY SCARLET LETTER 3023 
example, the EEOC has instituted guidelines for the use of “conviction 
questions” on job application forms, essentially limiting their use to when it 
is a matter of “business necessity.”143  Similarly, advocates in several states 
have followed suit, instituting “Ban-the-Box” initiatives that call for 
conviction questions to be removed from all initial application forms.144  
The National Employment Law Project reports that in 2013 and 2014 alone, 
eight states passed ban-the-box legislation.145  I argue for a federal law or 
congressional act that effectively bans the use of conviction questions on 
applications in all states.  The federal government should not stand by and 
watch piecemeal social reform, when it has the power to bring about 
nationwide reform on its own. 
In addition to eliminating conviction questions from initial employment 
applications, federal funding should be reinstated, both federal loans and 
the Pell Grant, for low-income students regardless of past criminal 
background.  As discussed above, lack of higher education—and the 
resulting limited social mobility—is a factor leading to crime, thus it does 
not serve the purpose of recidivism reduction for ex-offenders to be denied 
the means of attaining higher education.  Similarly, the ban-the-box 
initiative should be extended to college applications; meaning that 
conviction questions should be eliminated from college applications.146  As 
college education has now become the baseline for education and as its 
achievement has become a prerequisite for social mobility, the government 
owes a duty to ensure that all its citizens, including the formerly 
incarcerated, enjoy equal access to higher education. 
As discussed earlier in this Article, the achievement of higher education 
is particularly important for the formerly incarcerated woman as it serves to 
combat the stigma of incarceration that might otherwise render her 
unemployable.  Higher education also serves as a credential of job readiness 
and the necessary skills.  As it stands, however, former prisoners will have 
to confront the harsh truth that, according to the Chronicle of Higher 
Education, over 60 percent of colleges consider an applicant’s criminal 
history when making admission decisions.147  To make matters worse, most 
of those schools have no formal protocols in place to determine how 
criminal backgrounds should factor into the admission decision—thus 
creating a situation that is ripe for the covert discrimination of protected 
classes.148 
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 144. See Pam Fessler, How Banning One Question Could Help Ex-Offenders Land a Job, 
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 147. Sara Lipka, Experts Debate Fairness of Criminal-Background Checks on Students, 
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As the statistics show that many formerly incarcerated women lack 
higher education,149 allowing criminal backgrounds to factor into the 
admission decision creates an unnecessary hurdle for the formerly 
incarcerated woman on her path to social inclusion and upward mobility.  
Undoubtedly, the conviction question on the college application has a 
chilling effect on formerly incarcerated women who otherwise would be 
eager to continue their education after imprisonment. 
In addition to removing impediments to education and employment, the 
government should also consider the psychological havoc that barriers to 
family reunification wreak on the formerly incarcerated woman’s state of 
mind and motivation to reintegrate into society.  It is undoubtedly a 
psychological blow for a woman to understand that based on the length of 
her sentence alone, rather than her suitability for parenting, she is now 
eligible to lose all parental rights to her children.  Rather, allowing women 
the opportunity to regain custody of their children based on their good 
behavior in prison and other demonstrated fitness such as pursuit of higher 
education and employment will serve as motivation for these women to turn 
away from a life of crime, buoyed in the knowledge that reunification with 
their children awaits them. 
B.   Enabling Reintegration 
Besides eliminating institutional policies that hinder the economic 
progress of formerly incarcerated women, the government also holds a 
positive obligation to enact policies that would enable and facilitate their 
reintegration into society.  The first of those policies is to emphasize higher 
education in all prison systems, making it possible for women to earn 
higher education degrees while they are incarcerated.  It is unfair that, for 
women, the continuation of their education comes to rest on fickle fortune 
determining where they are incarcerated rather than on their personal ability 
and initiative. 
V.   MANDATING A BETTER MODEL OF REENTRY 
Beyond merely eliminating collateral legal consequences that serve as 
stumbling blocks for the formerly incarcerated, the government has a duty 
to take on an active role in creating a model of reentry that facilitates the 
reintegration of formerly incarcerated women into society. 
A.   Gender-Neutral Policies Ignore the Needs of Women 
Historically, there always have been more men in prison than women.150  
Thus, it is not surprising that the model of reentry espoused by reentry 
 
 149. See CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 195670, 
EDUCATION AND CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS 1 (2003), available at 
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IN 2011, at 2 (2012), available at http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=4559. 
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organizations is a “gender neutral” one that fails to take into account the 
differing needs of formerly incarcerated women.  However, women now 
represent the fastest growing population in prison151 and this also will have 
an impact on the population of those who identify as formerly incarcerated. 
B.   Regulations for a More Inclusive Model 
The Second Chance Act152 enacted in 2008 was designed to facilitate the 
societal reentry of formerly incarcerated individuals.  It is the first type of 
legislation to confer federal grants to government agencies and nonprofit 
organizations that are engaged in providing support strategies for the 
formerly incarcerated and services designed to reduce recidivism.153  The 
availability of this funding source has resulted in a proliferation of non-
profit organizations with the mission statement of aiding formerly 
incarcerated people in their quest to reintegrate into society, vying to 
receive grant money.154  Most of these organizations derive their financial 
support from a combination of grants made available through the Second 
Chance Act and contributions from private donors.155 
The statistics indicate that the Second Chance Act has contributed to 
reduced recidivism,156 and there is a strong argument that it should be 
reauthorized.157  However, I argue that the implementation of the Act 
should be modified to include more gender-specific guidelines and 
standards158 placed on the public and private organizations that receive the 
grant. 
 
 151. The number of female prisoners rose at a faster rate (4.8 percent) than the number of 
male prisoners (2.7 percent).  The percent increase in female prisoners was almost twice that 
of male prisoners. WILLIAM J. SABOL, TODD D. MINTON & PAIGE M. HARRISON, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 217675, PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2006. (2007) (rev. 
2008), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pjim06.pdf. 
 152. Pub. L. No. 110-199, 122 Stat. 657 (2008). 
 153. See Second Chance Act Prisoner Reentry Initiative, CATALOG OF FED. DOMESTIC 
ASSISTANCE, https://www.cfda.gov/index?s=program&mode=form&tab=core&id= 
0f0083d29a6d817d18734debda07293a (last visited Apr. 23, 2015). 
 154. LYNNE HANEY, OFFENDING WOMEN:  POWER PUNISHMENT AND THE REGULATION OF 
DESIRE 101–03 (2010). 
 155. Since 2009, nearly 600 Second Chance Act grant awards have been made to 
government agencies and non-profit organizations from forty-nine states for reentry 
programs serving adults and juveniles. See THE SECOND CHANCE ACT:  JUVENILE REENTRY 
(2014), available at http://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/SCA_Juvenile_ 
Reentry.pdf. 
 156. States like Ohio, Texas, Kansas, and Michigan, which have embraced the Second 
Chance Act, have seen dramatic decreases in recidivism. See Rob Portman & J.C. Watts, 
Reauthorize Second Chance Act:  Rob Portman and J.C. Watts, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER 
(Apr. 29, 2013, 3:00 AM), http://www.cleveland.com/opinion/index.ssf/2013/04/ 
reauthorize_second_chance_act.html. 
 157. See id. 
 158. For the 2015 eligibility guidelines and standards for Second Chance Act grant 
funding, see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SECOND CHANCE ACT TWO-PHASE ADULT REENTRY 
DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM:  PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION FY 2015 COMPETITIVE GRANT 
ANNOUNCEMENT (2015), available at https://www.bja.gov/Funding/ 
15SCAReentryDemoSol.pdf. 
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The federal government, through the Second Chance Act, has an 
opportunity to develop a better model of reentry which takes into account 
the intersectional identities of formerly incarcerated women and ensures 
that they are not subjected to a “gender neutral” model that favors formerly 
incarcerated men. 
As noted earlier in this Article, formerly incarcerated women face 
distinct reentry struggles from their male counterparts because of their 
intersectional identities as women convicted of a crime, as primary 
caregivers of minor children, as victims of domestic violence and sexual 
abuse, and as racial minorities.159  Thus, through the Second Chance Act, 
the government should ensure that the programs it funds are cognizant of 
these identities.  Any program seeking funding should be required to prove 
that (1) it has in place programming specific to women’s mental and 
physical needs; (2) in-house childcare services or a system for women to 
obtain reliable and secure childcare services; and (3) counseling for 
domestic violence and sexual abuse. 
CONCLUSION 
The collateral legal consequences of criminal conviction 
disproportionately impact women primarily because they cumulatively 
serve as a modern day scarlet letter that attaches to formerly incarcerated 
women for life and which renders the women’s attempts to reintegrate into 
society Sisyphean.  Beyond merely creating or recreating collateral 
consequences that might impact men and women equally, it behooves the 
government to reconsider whether collateral legal consequences serve to 
reduce recidivism, which is perhaps the most important goal of punishment. 
It is also the government’s duty to provide greater oversight over the 
funding it provides for reentry programs to ensure that the model of practice 
for such programs takes into account the intersectional identities of 
formerly incarcerated women and their particular needs.  It is without 
argument that society as a whole benefits from the successful reintegration 
of formerly incarcerated women.  Thus, a responsive government should 
not actively or passively promote practices that would stymie that very 
process. 
 
 
 159. See supra Part III. 
